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Abstract
Motivated by online reputation systems, we investigate social learning in a network where agents
interact on a time dependent graph to estimate an underlying state of nature. Agents record their own
private observations, then update their private beliefs about the state of nature using Bayes’ rule. Based
on their belief, each agent then chooses an action (rating) from a finite set and transmits this action
over the social network. An important consequence of such social learning over a network is the ruinous
multiple re-use of information known as data incest (or mis-information propagation). In this paper, the
data incest management problem in social learning context is formulated on a directed acyclic graph. We
give necessary and sufficient conditions on the graph topology of social interactions to eliminate data
incest. A data incest removal algorithm is proposed such that the public belief of social learning (and
hence the actions of agents) is not affected by data incest propagation. This results in an online reputation
system with a higher trust rating. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the performance of the
proposed optimal data incest removal algorithm.
Index Terms
Bayesian models, social networks, data incest, directed acyclic graph, herding, mis-information
propagation, social learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
In social learning, agents aim to estimate the state of nature using their private observations and actions
from other agents [1]. The process of updating belief by agents can be done using Bayesian models [2],
[3] or non-Bayesian models [4], [5]. In this paper, we consider Bayesian social learning models along with
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“data incest” also known as mis-information propagation [6]. This results in a non-standard information
pattern for Bayesian estimation. Before proceeding to the formal definition of data incest in learning over
social networks, let us describe the social learning model.
A. Bayesian Social Learning Protocol on Network
Consider a social network comprising of S agents that aim to estimate (localize) an underlying state
of nature (a random variable). Let x ∈ {x1, x2, · · · , xX} represent a state of nature (such as quality
of a hotel) with known prior distribution pi0 where X denotes the dimension of the state space. Let
k = 1, 2, 3, . . . depict epochs at which events occur. These events comprise of taking observations,
evaluating beliefs and choosing actions as described below. The index k depicts the historical order of
events and not necessarily absolute time. However, for simplicity, we refer to k as “time” in the rest of
the paper.
The agents use the following Bayesian social learning protocol to estimate the state of nature:
Step 1. Private observations: To estimate the state of nature x, each agent records its M -dimensional
private observation vector. At each time k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., each agent s (1 ≤ s ≤ S) obtains a noisy private
observation z[s,k] from the finite set1 Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zZ} with conditional probability
Bij = p(z[s,k] = zj |x = xi). (1)
It is assumed that the observations z[s,k] are independent random variables with respect to agent s and
time k2.
Step 2. Private belief: After obtaining its private observation, each agent combines its private
observation with the information received form the network to evaluate its belief about state of nature.
Define
Θ[s,k] = set of all information received from network available at agent s at time k,
(2)
1The results of this paper also apply to continuous-valued observations. We consider discrete-valued observations since humans
typically record discrete observations.
2It is not necessary for agents to record observations at each time k and this does not interfere with the common knowledge
assumption in social learning where agents all know about the structure of social learning model. Agents at different time instants
are treated as different nodes in our graphical model. The assumption that agents record observation at each time k simplifies
notation.
Each agent s combines its private observation z[s,k] with the most updated public belief (posterior
distribution of state of nature given actions of previous agents) and evaluates its private belief about
state of nature3. Agents use Bayesian social learning to update their private beliefs. The private belief,
µ[s,k], is defined as the posterior distribution of the state of nature given the private observation and all
information received from other agents in the social network, that is
µ[s,k] = (µ[s,k](i), 1 ≤ i ≤ X),where µ[s,k](i) = p
(
x = xi|Θ[s,k], z[s,k]
)
. (3)
Note that the agent’s private belief (private opinion) is not available to other agents or network admin-
istrator (who runs the online reputation system).
Step 3. Local action: Based on its private belief µ[s,k], agent s at time k chooses an action a[s,k] from
a finite set A = {1, 2, . . . , A} to minimize its expected cost function (based on the current information
available on the network). That is
a[s,k] = argmin
a∈A
E{C(x, a)|Θ[s,k], z[s,k]}. (4)
Here E denotes expectation and C(x, a) denotes the cost incurred by the agent if action a is chosen
when the state of nature is x.
Step 4. Social network: Individual agents broadcast their actions a[s,k] over the social network4.
These actions are observed by other agents after a random delay. We model this information exchange
using a family of directed acyclic graphs. Let
G[s,k] = (V[s,k], E[s,k]), k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , s = 1, 2, . . . , S, (5)
denote a sequence of time-dependent graphs of information flow in the social network until and including
time k. Each vertex in V[s,k] represents an agent s in the social network at time k and each edge
((s′, k′), (s′′, k′′)) in E[s,k] ⊆ V[s,k] × V[s,k] shows that the information (action) of agent s′ at time k′
reaches agent s′′ at time k′′.
3The scenario where agents choose their actions according to the most recent public belief is similar to the classical social
learning formulation [7] where actions are transmitted over the network. In this scenario, the information received from the
network, Θ[s,k], is the most updated public belief which is computed in Step 5.
4We assume that multiple agents can transmit simultaneously over the network without interfering with each other. This is
realistic in a social network, since the time required to exchange (broadcast) information is substantially smaller than the time
to record observations, update beliefs or take actions.
Step 5. Network’s public belief update: The network administrator only has access to the local
actions of agents. The public belief of the network administrator is the posterior distribution of state of
nature given the actions of all agents at previous times. The goal of the paper is to design the network
administrator’s public belief update.
As we will see shortly, a major issue with the above protocol is the inadvertent reuse of information
(actions of previous agents) which makes the estimates of state of nature biased; that is data incest.
Aim: The objective of the paper is to design Step 5 of the above protocol so that when agents use
Step 2, data incest is mitigated. The aim is to combine the information received from agents to compute
p(x|Θ[s,k])
5
.
The above protocol models the interaction of agents in a social network that aim to estimate the
underlying state of nature x. An example is where users aim to localize a target event by tweeting the
location of the detected “target” on Twitter [8]. Another example is where the state of nature is the
true quality of a social unit (such as restaurant). Online reputation systems such as Yelp or Tripadvisor
maintain logs of votes by agents (customers). Each agent visits a restaurant based on reviews on a
reputation website such as Yelp. The agent then obtains private noisy measurement of the state (quality
of food in a restaurant). The agent then reviews the restaurant on that reputation website. Such a review
typically is a quantized version (for example, rating) of the total information (private belief) gathered
by the agent6. With such a protocol, how can agents obtain a fair (unbiased) estimate of the underlying
state?7. The aim of this paper is for the network administrator to maintain an unbiased reputation system,
or alternatively modify the actions of agents, to avoid incest.
B. Context: Data Incest in Social Learning
From a statistical signal processing point of view, estimating the state of nature x using the above
five-step protocol is non-standard in two ways: First, agents are influenced by the rating of other agents,
5An alternative method is to modify Step 4 such that the network administrator maps the agents’ action in Step 3 to a new
action and transmits it over the network. In other words, each agent submits a private recommendation (action) and the network
administrant suitably modifies this action to avoid incest (using the algorithms we present in Sec.III).
6The dimension of private beliefs is typically larger than that of actions. Also, individuals tend not to provide their private
beliefs at the time of their further social interactions. Therefore, agents map their beliefs to a finite set of actions which are
easier to broadcast.
7Having fair estimates of quality of a social unit is a problem of much interest in business. Most of hotel managers (81%)
regularly check the reviews on Tripadvisor [9]. In [10], it is found that a one-star increase in the average rating of users in Yelp
is mapped to about 5-9 % revenue increase.
Fig. 1: Two examples of multi-agent social learning in social networks: (i) target localization, and (ii)
online reputation systems.
this is prior influences their posterior and hence their rating. This effect of agents learning from the
actions (ratings) of other agents along with its own private observation is termed “social learning” in the
economics literature. Social learning can result in interesting phenomenon where rational agents can all
end up making the same decision (herding and information cascades; [7]). Second, (and this effect is
more complex), an agent might be influenced by his own rating leading to data incest.
To explain what can go wrong with the above protocol, suppose an agent wrote a poor rating of the
restaurant on a social media site at time 1. Another agent is influenced by this rating and also gives the
restaurant a poor rating at time 2. Assume that the diffusion of action is modeled by the graph depicted
in Fig.2. The first agent visits the social media site at time 3 and sees that another agent has also given
the restaurant a poor rating - this double confirms his rating and he enters another poor rating. In a fair
system, the first agent should have been aware that the rating of the second agent was influenced by his
rating - so that first agent has effectively double counted his first rating by casting the second poor rating.
Data incest is a consequence of the recursive nature of Bayesian social learning and the communication
graph. The data incest in a social network is defined as the naive re-use of actions of other agents in the
formation of the belief of an agent when these actions could have been initiated by the agent.
The two effects of social learning and data incest lead to non-standard information patterns in state
estimation. Herd occurs when the public belief overrides the private observations and thus actions of
agents are independent of their private observations. An extreme case of this is an information cascade
when the public belief of social learning hits a fixed point and does not evolve any longer. Each agent in
Fig. 2: Example of communication graph, with two agents (S = 2) and over three event epoches (K = 3).
The arrows represent exchange of information regarding actions taken by agents.
a cascade acts according to the fixed public belief and social learning stops [7]8. Data incest results in
bias in the public belief as a consequence of the unintentional re-use of identical actions in the formation
of public belief of social learning; the information gathered by each agent is mistakenly considered to
be independent. This results in over confidence and bias in estimates of state of nature. Due to the lack
of information about the topology of the communication graph, data incest arises in Bayesian social
learning in social networks. Therefore, the Bayesian social learning protocol requires a careful design to
ensure that data incest is mitigated. The aim of this paper is to modify the five-step protocol presented
in Sec.I-A such that data incest does not arise. As we will see in Sec.III-D, the proposed data incest
removal algorithm can be applied to the state estimation problems shown in Fig.1.
C. Main Results and Paper Organization:
With the above five-step social learning protocol in social networks, we are now ready to outline the
main results of this paper:
1) In Sec.II, the data incest problem is formulated on a family of time dependent directed acyclic
graphs
2) In Sec.III, a necessary and sufficient condition on the graph is provided for exact data incest removal.
This constraint is on the topology of communication delays (communication graph). Also examples
where exact incest removal is not possible are illustrated.
8There are subtle differences between an individual agent herding, a herd of agents and an information cascade; see for
example [7], [11].
3) A data incest removal algorithm is proposed for the five-step social learning protocol in Sec.III. The
data incest removal algorithm is employed by the network administrator to update the public belief
in Step 5 of the social learning protocol of Sec.I-A9.
Finally in Sec.IV, numerical examples are provided which illustrate the data incest removal algorithm.
D. Related Works:
Social learning theory is used to investigate the learning behavior of agents in social and economic
networks [1]. There are several papers in the literature discussing Bayesian models [12], [2], [13], [14],
[11] and non-Bayesian models [4], [5] for social learning. Different models for diffusion of beliefs in
social networks are presented in [15]. For a comprehensive survey on herding and information cascade in
social learning, see [7]. Stochastic control with social learning for sequential change detection problems
is considered in [16].
Mis-information in the signal processing literature refers to faulty or inaccurate information which is
broadcasted unintentionally. A different type of mis-information called “gossip” is investigated in [17]
where non-Bayesian models are employed. A model of Bayesian social learning where agents receive
private information about state of nature and observe the actions of their neighbors is investigated in
[18]. They proposed an algorithm for agents’ calculations on tree-based social networks and analyzed
their algorithm in terms of efficiency and convergence. Another category of mis-information caused by
influential agents (agents who heavily affect actions of other agents in social networks) is investigated in
[1]. Mis-information in the context of this paper is motivated by sensor networks where the term “data
incest” is used [19]. In multi-agent social learning in networks, data incest occurs when information
(action) of one agent is double-counted by other agents (due to the lack of information about the topology
of the communication graph); this yields to overconfidence.
The overconfidence phenomena (caused by data incest) also arises in Belief Propagation (BP) algo-
rithms [20], [21] which are used in computer vision and error-correcting coding theory. The aim of
BP algorithms is to solve inference problems over graphical models such as Bayesian networks (where
nodes represent random variables and edges depict dependencies among them) by computing a marginal
distribution. BP algorithms require passing local messages over the graph (Bayesian network) at each
9In this paper we consider Bayesian estimation over a finite time horizon. We do not consider the asymptotic agreement of
social learning or consensus formation in social networks. Consensus formation is asymptotic and typically non-Bayesian. From
a practical point of view, information exchange in a social network is typically over a finite horizon.
iteration. These algorithms converge to the exact marginal distribution when the factor graph is a tree
(loop free). But for graphical models with loops, BP algorithms are only approximate due to the over-
counting of local messages [22] (which is similar to data incest in multi-agent social learning)10. With the
algorithm presented in Sec.III, data incest can be mitigated from Bayesian social learning over non-tree
graphs that satisfy a topological constraint.
The closest work to the current paper is [6]. In [6], [23], data incest is considered in a network where
agents exchange their private belief states - that is, no social learning is considered. In a social network,
agents rarely exchange private beliefs, they typically broadcast actions (votes) over the network. Motivated
by trustable online reputation systems, we consider data incest in a social learning context with social
network structure where actions (or equivalently public belief of the social learning) are transmitted over
the network. This is quite different from private belief propagation in social networks. Simpler versions of
this information exchange process and estimation were investigated by Aumann [24] and Geanakoplosand
and Polemarchakis [25]. The results derived in this paper extend theirs.
Finally, the methodology of this paper can be interpreted in terms of the recent Time magazine article
[26] which provides interesting rules for online reputation systems. These include: (i) review the reviewers,
(ii) censor fake (malicious) reviewers. The data incest removal algorithm proposed in this paper can be
viewed as “reviewing the reviews” of other agents to see if they are associated with data incest or not.
E. Limitations
We do not consider the case where the network is not known to the administrator. The state of nature
in this paper is a random variable and we do not allow for estimating a random process. In this paper, we
consider Bayesian estimation over a finite time horizon and the asymptotic agreement of social learning
is not considered in this paper.
II. SOCIAL LEARNING OVER SOCIAL NETWORKS
In this section, a graphical model is presented for the five-step social learning protocol introduced in
Sec.I-A. In the evaluation of the private belief by agents, data incest may arise as a result of abusive re-
use of information of other agents (caused by the lack of information about the topology of the network
and the recursive nature of Bayesian models).
10 There exists some similarities between BP and social learning in the sense that they are both systematic structures to
perform Bayesian inference over graphs. However, they are not related in principle. While graphs represent social interactions
among agents in social learning, graphical models in BP depict the conditional dependency between nodes (random variables)–
they do not imply the actual communications, see[15].
A. Social Network Communication Model
With the five-step social learning protocol presented in Sec.I-A and the graph theoretic definitions
provided in Appendix A, here we discuss the diffusion of actions in the resulting social network. For
notational simplicity, instead of [s, k], the following scalar index n is used:
n , s+ S(k − 1), s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} . (6)
Recall that in the social learning model considered in the paper, the historical order of events is important
and k is used to denote the order of occurrence of events in real time. Subsequently, we will refer to n
as a “node” of the time dependent communication graph Gn. Recall from Sec.I, Gn = (Vn, En) denotes
the time-dependent communication graph of the social network. Each node n′ in Gn represent an agent
s′ at time k′ such that n′ = s′ + S(k′ − 1), see (6). Each directed edge of Gn shows a communication
link in the social network represented by Gn. This means that if (n, n′) ∈ En, agent s′ at time k′ uses the
information of agent s at time k to update his private belief about the underlying state of nature x. Note
that with the way we defined the communication graph, Gn is always a sub-graph of Gn+1. Therefore,
as the following theorem proves, diffusion of actions can be modeled via a family of time-dependent
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs)11.
Theorem 2.1: The information flow in a social learning over social networks comprising of S agents
for k = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,K can be represented by a family of DAGs G = {Gn}n∈{1,...,N} where N = SK.
Each DAG Gn = (Vn, En) represents the information flow between the n first nodes, where the generic
node n is defined by (6).
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix B.
The adjacency and the transitive closure matrices of Gn are denoted by An and Tn, respectively (see
Appendix A). Using the adjacency and transitive closure matrices of Gn, all nodes whose information
are available at node n can be found. From that, Θn is specified (see Eq. (2)).
B. Constrained Social Learning in Social Networks
The observation process and the evaluation of private belief are described in Sec.I-A. With the scalar
index defined in (6), the observation vector and the private belief of node n (that represents agent s at
time k) are denoted by zn and µn, respectively. Recall from Sec.I that the public belief of the network
11See (24) in Appendix A.
is the posterior distribution of state of nature given all information available at node n, that is12
pi−n = (pi−n(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ X),where pi−n(i) = p(x = xi|Θn). (7)
After action an is chosen (by agent s at time k), the public belief of social learning changes (because
of the most recent action an). To avoid confusion, we define “after-action” public belief which includes
action an, that is
pi+n = (pi+n(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ X),where pi+n(i) = p(x = xi|Θn, an). (8)
Note that the scenario where agents in social network have access to the most up-to-date public belief
and updates their private beliefs accordingly (using the public belief of social learning and their private
observations) is similar to the classical social learning setup where agents transmit their actions over the
network. As discussed in Sec.I, here instead of classical social learning setup, we consider a scenario that
the network administrator evaluates the after-action public beliefs of agents and transmits them over the
network. When action an is chosen by an agent and submitted to the network, the network administrator
computes the corresponding after-action public belief immediately (without delay) and broadcasts it over
the network. As discussed in Sec.I, due to the communication delay, the transmitted belief reaches other
agents after a random delay (which is modeled via communication graph Gn with adjacency matrix An
and transitive closure matrix Tn). In this scenario Θn is defined as
Θn = {pi+i; (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) and An(i, n) = 1} (9)
The following lemma shows how to update private belief, choose local action , and finally update the
after-action public belief using Θn and zn.
Lemma 2.1: Consider the five-step social learning protocol presented in Sec.I-A with S agents and
the communication graph Gn. Let pi−n denote the public belief of social network at this node. Then, the
social learning elements (private belief, action, and after-action public belief) of node n with observation
12Recall from Sec.I-A that Θn denotes the set of all information available at node n.
vector zn = zl can be computed from (1 ≤ m ≤ X)
µn(m) = p (x = xm|Θn, zn) ∝ cpi−n(m)Bml,
an = argmin
a∈A
E{C(x, a)|Θn, zn} = argmin
a∈A
E{C ′aµn},
pi+n(m) ∝ cpi−n(m)
Z∑
j=1

 ∏
â∈A−{an}
I(C ′anBjpi−n < C
′
âBjpi−n)

Bmj, (10)
where c is a generic normalizing constant, Bj = diag(B1j, . . . , BXj), and I(·) is indicator function.
Here, Ca is the cost vector defined as Ca = [C(1, a) C(2, a) . . . C(X, a)].
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix C.
Lemma 2.1 summarizes the social learning problem considered in this paper. Node n receives a set of
after-action public beliefs and combines them to compute pi−n from which the private belief can be
computed (using private observation zn). As described in Sec.I, a major issue with the above protocol
is data incest (because information in Θn are mistakenly considered to be independent in information
aggregation process). The aim of this paper is to devise a data incest removal algorithm for the network
administrator to deploy such that the estimates of agents are unbiased.
To formulate the data incest problem that arises in the five-step protocol of Sec.I, two following types of
social learning protocols are presented: (i) constrained social learning protocol which we introduce shortly
(see Fig.3), and (ii) idealized social learning which is investigated in Sec.III. The five-step constrained
social learning protocol introduced in Sec.I-A, is illustrated in Fig.3. Note that in the constrained social
learning problem described in Protocol 1, agents do not have information about the communication graph.
This is why the term “constrained” is used. With Protocol 1, the constrained social learning in social
networks can be summarized as

zn ∼ Biz, x = i, (observation process)
an = S(Θn, zn), (choosing local action)
pi+n = A(Θn, an) (updating the after action belief)
(11)
In (11) Algorithm A is employed by the network administrator to update the after-action public belief. Due
to the lack of knowledge about the communication graph (and the recursive nature of Bayesian models),
data incest arises in constrained social learning if algorithm A is not designed properly. Algorithm S in
(11) is employed by each agent to choose its action; this algorithm can be constructed using the results
Fig. 3: Protocol 1: Constrained social learning in social networks described in Sec.I-A. As a result of
random (unknown) communication delays, data incest arises.
of Lemma 2.1. The aim of this paper is to devise the algorithms A and S such that the public belief of
social learning (or equivalently actions an for all n = 1, 2, . . .) are not affected by data incest.
Remark 1: In order to choose an action from the finite set of all possible actions, agents minimize
a cost function. This cost function can be interpreted in terms of the reputation of agents in online
reputation systems. For example if the quality of a restaurant is good and an agent wrote a bad review
for it in Yelp and he continues to do so for other restaurants, his reputation becomes lower among the
users of Yelp. Consequently, other people ignore reviews of that (low-reputation) agent in evaluation of
their opinion about the social unit under study (restaurant). Therefore, agents minimize the penalty of
writing inaccurate reviews (or equivalently increase their reputations) by choosing proper actions. This
behavior is modeled by minimizing a cost function in our social learning model.
Remark 2: In comparison to the public belief which can be computed by the network administrator
(who monitors the agents’ actions and communication graph), the agents’ private beliefs cannot be
computed by the network administrator. The private belief depends on the local observation which is
not available to the network. Note that in Step 2 of the constrained social learning Protocol 1, the results
of Lemma 2.1 are used to compute µn using zn and pi−n.
III. DATA INCEST REMOVAL ALGORITHM
So far in this paper, Bayesian social learning model and communication among agents in social
networks have been described. This section presents the main result of this paper, namely the solution
to the constrained social learning problem (11). We propose a data incest removal algorithm such that
the public belief of social learning (and consequently the chosen action) is not affected by data incest.
To devise the data incest removal algorithm, an idealized framework is presented that prevents data
incest as we will describe shortly. Comparing the public belief of the idealized framework with the
same of the constrained social learning, the data incest removal algorithm is specified. This data incest
removal algorithm is used by the network administrator and replaces Step 5 of the social learning protocol
presented in Sec.I-A. A necessary and sufficient condition for the data incest removal problem is also
presented in this section.
A. The Idealized Benchmark for Data Incest Free Social Learning in Social Networks
In this subsection, an idealized (and therefore impractical) framework that will be used as a benchmark
to derive the constrained social learning protocol, is described. In the idealized protocol, it is assumed
that the entire history of actions along with the communication graph are known at each node. Due to
the knowledge about the entire history of actions and the communication graph (dependencies among
actions) in the idealized framework, data incest does not arise13. Define
Θfulln = {ai; (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) and Tn(i, n) = 1}. (12)
Here, Tn is the transitive closure matrix of the communication graph Gn. In the idealized framework,
the public belief can be written as
p(x|Θfulln ) ∝ pi0
∏
ai∈Θfulln
p(ai|x, Si), (13)
where Si ⊂ Θfulln denotes the set of actions that ai depends on them. The public belief in the idealized
social learning is free of data incest, as it can be inferred from (13). The idealized social learning in
social networks (Protocol 2) is illustrated in Fig.4. The private belief of node n in the idealized social
learning is denoted by µ̂n.
With Protocol 2, the idealized social learning problem can be summarized as

Gn = (Vn, En) is given.
zn ∼ Biz, x = i, (observation process)
an = F(Θ
full
n , zn, Gn), (choosing local action)
pi+n = B(Θ
full
n , an) (updating the after action belief)
(14)
13In the constrained social learning algorithm, each node receives the most recent after-action public beliefs of its neighbors
or equivalently the updated public belief.
Fig. 4: Protocol 2: Idealized benchmark social learning in social networks. In this protocol, the complete
history of actions chosen by agents and the communication graph are known. Hence, data incest does
not arise. This benchmark protocol will be used to design the data incest removal protocol.
We use pi−n and pi+n to denote the public belief and the after-action public belief of social learning at
node n in the idealized social learning Protocol 2, respectively. Algorithm B in the social learning problem
(14) is the ordinary recursive Bayesian filter to update pi+n. In Algorithm B, first pi−n is computed via
(13) and then the results of Lemma 2.1 are applied to choose an. Note that if there exists a path between
node i and node n, then action ai ∈ Θfulln . Since the history of actions and the communication topology
are available in the idealized social learning Protocol 2, pipn is free of data incest.
Remark 3: The idealized social learning Protocol 2 requires agents to know the entire history of
actions and also the dependencies among these actions which seems impractical in large social networks.
However, this protocol serves as a benchmark against the constrained social learning Protocol 1, hence
its practicality is irrelevant. The aim of this idealized benchmark protocol is to specify the data incest
removal algorithm which can be done by comparing the social learning public belief of Protocol 1 and
Protocol 2 as we will show shortly.
B. The Data Incest Free Belief in the Idealized Social Learning Protocol 2
The goal of this paper is to replace Step 5 of the five-step constrained social learning Protocol 1 with an
algorithm that mitigates data incest. As described earlier, to solve the data incest management problem, we
introduced the idealized social learning Protocol 2 that prevents data incest. By comparing the after-action
public beliefs of agents in the idealized social learning Protocol 2 with those in the constrained social
learning Protocol 1, the data incest removal algorithm can be invented. In this subsection, an expression
is derived for the after-action public beliefs of agents in the idealized social learning Protocol 2. Let θfulln
denote the logarithm of the after-action public belief pi+n in the idealized social learning Protocol 2, that
is
θfulln = log
(
p(x|Θfulln , an, Gn)
)
. (15)
Theorem 3.1 below gives an expression for the after-action public belief in the idealized social Protocol 2.
Theorem 3.1: Consider problem (14) with the idealized social learning Protocol 2. The data incest
free after-action public belief of node n (which represents agent s at time k according to re-indexing
equation (6)) is:
θfulln =
n−1∑
i=1
tn(i)νi + νn, (16)
where νk denotes log (p(ak|x, Sk)).Recall that tn defined in (27) in Appendix A as the first n−1 elements
of the nth column of Tn.
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix D.
As can be seen in (16), the (logarithm of the) after-action public belief of node n can be written as a linear
function in terms of νi using tn. Due to this linearity, the data incest removal algorithm can be constructed
as we will explain later in this section. Also (16) implies that the optimal data incest free after-action
public beliefs of agents in the idealized social learning Protocol 2 depend on the communication graph
explicitly in terms of the transitive closure matrix14. Basically the non-zero elements of tn show all nodes
who have a path to node n and thus their actions contribute in the formation of the private belief of node
n. Eq. (16) is quite intuitive from the fact that each agent employs a recursive Bayesian filter to combine
its private observation with the information received from the network.
C. Data Incest Removal Algorithm for Problem (11) With Constrained Social Learning Protocol 1
Given the expression for the after-action public belief of the idealized social learning Protocol 2, the
aim here is to propose an optimal information aggregation scheme (that replaces Step 5) such that the
after-action public belief of the constrained social learning Protocol 1 is equal to the same of the idealized
14See (24) in Appendix A.
social learning Protocol 2 (which is free of data incest)15. That is,
p(x|Θn, an) = p(x|Θ
full
n , an, Gn). (17)
Similar to θfulln , let θ̂n denote the logarithm of the after action public belief of node n,
θ̂n = log (p(x|Θn, an)) . (18)
We propose the following optimal information aggregation scheme to evaluate the after-action public
belief using a n− 1 dimensional weight vector wn as follows,
θ̂n =
n−1∑
i=1
wn(i)θ̂i + νn, (19)
where wn with elements wn(i) (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) is defined more precisely in (21). Using optimal
information aggregation scheme (19) and (10) in Lemma 2.1, algorithm A in (11) can be specified.
Remark 4: The optimal information aggregation scheme (19) is deployed by the network administrator
in Step 5 of the social learning protocol presented in Sec.I-A to combine the received information (after-
action public beliefs or equivalently actions) form other nodes and computes ∑n−1i=1 wn(i)θ̂i, this is the
public belief of social learning at node n. Then, node n updates its private belief based on the most
updated public belief (provided by the network administrator) and chooses its action an accordingly and
then transmits it over the network. Then, the network administrator evaluates νn and updates the after-
action public belief by computing θ̂n =
∑n−1
i=1 wn(i)θ̂i+νn. Alternatively, the network administrator can
compute the most recent after-action public belief of nodes and transmits it over the network. In this
case, node n combines the received after-action public beliefs using the optimal weight vector wn and
chooses its action an. Then, the action an is broadcasted to the network administrator and the after-action
public belief of node n is updated accordingly.
The weight vector wn depends on the communication graph and can be computed simply by (21).
Theorem 3.2 below proves that by using the optimal information aggregation scheme (19) with wn defined
in (21), data incest can be completely mitigated. However, for some network topologies, it is not possible
to remove data incest completely. The following constraint presents the necessary and sufficient condition
on the network for the exact data incest removal.
Topological Constraint 1: Consider the constrained social learning problem (11) with Protocol 1. Then,
15From that, algorithm A in problem (11) with constrained social learning Protocol 1 can be specified.
the weight vector wn used in optimal information aggregation scheme (19) satisfies the topological
constraints if ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}
bn(j) = 0 =⇒ wn(j) = 0, (20)
where bn is defined in (27) and denotes the n-th column of the adjacency matrix of Gn. Basically
Constraint 1 puts the “availability constraint” on the communication graph. This means that if information
of node j is required at node n (wn(j) 6= 0), there should be a communication link between node j and
node n (bn(j) 6= 0). Assuming that Constraint 1 holds, Theorem 3.2 below ensures that the (after-action)
public belief of nodes in problem (11) with the constrained social learning Protocol 1 is identical to the
same of the problem (14) with the idealized social learning Protocol 2.
Theorem 3.2: Consider problem (11) with the constrained social learning Protocol 1 of Sec.II. Then
using the optimal information aggregation scheme (19), data incest can be mitigated by using the optimal
set of weights {wn}n∈{1,...,N} given that the topological Constraint 1 is satisfied. The optimal weight
vector is
wn = tn
(
(Tn−1)
′)−1 . (21)
By using the optimal combination scheme (19) and optimal weight vector defined in (21), the data incest
in social learning problem (11) is completely mitigated, that is θ̂n = θfulln if wn satisfies topological
Constraint 1 where θ̂n and θfulln are defined in (18) and (15) respectively. Recall that tn is defined in
(27) as the first n− 1 elements of the nth column of Tn.
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix E.
In the proposed optimal information aggregation scheme (19), the after-action public belief of each node
(which represents an agent at specific time instant) can be written as a linear combination of the received
information from the network and the local action (combined with the optimal weight vector wn). This is
quite intuitive from the linearity of the after-action public belief in the idealized social learning Protocol 2.
Theorem 3.1 derives the after-action public belief of agents in problem (14) with the idealized social
learning Protocol 2, θfulln , as a linear function of received information from the social network. Then,
assuming that θ̂1:n−1 = θfull1:n−1, the optimal weight vector wn is specified such that θ̂n = θfulln . Theorem 3.2
proves that if wn = tn
(
(Tn−1)
′)−1 then θ̂n = θfulln .
Using the optimal information aggregation scheme (19), the five-step Bayesian social learning protocol
in Sec.I-A with data incest removal algorithm can be summarized as
Algorithm 1 Constrained Bayesian social learning with data incest removal algorithm at each node n
Step 1. Observation process: Private observation vector zn is obtained according to (1).
Step 2. Private belief: Node n accesses the network and evaluates its private belief according to (3) using the most updated public
belief pi−n.
Step 3. Local action: Action an is chosen via (4).
Step 4. Social network: The network administrator evaluates (maps an to) the after-action public belief using the information
aggregation scheme (19) and transmits it over the network.
Step 5. Public belief update: The network administrator provides the optimal weight vector wn to nodes to combine the information
received from the network Θn or alternatively it can provides the most up-to-date public belief pi−n to each node.
Discussion of topological constraint (20): The non-zero elements of wn depict the nodes whose
information are required at node n to remove data incest. This puts a topological constraint on the
communication graph. If wn(j) is non-zero, this means that information of node j is needed at node n
and there should be an edge in Gn that connects node j to node n, this is the topological Constraint 1.
Constraint 1 ensures that the essential elements for data incest removal are available at node n and
Theorem 3.2 specifies the exact data incest removal algorithm. From Theorem 3.2, it is simple to show
that Constraint 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for data incest removal in learning problem (11).
Consider two examples of communication graph shown in Fig.5.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: Two examples of networks: (a) satisfies the topological constraint, and (b) does not satisfy the
topological constraint.
The optimal weight vector at node 5 for both networks of Fig.5 computed from (21) is w5 =
[−1,−1, 1, 1]. This means that there should be a link between node 2 and node 5 for exact data incest
removal according to the topological constraint (20). Hence, Constraint 1 does not hold for the network
of Fig.5b, while the topological constraint is satisfied in network depicted in Fig.5a. Also as it is clear
Fig. 6: Data incest removal algorithm employed by network administrator in the state estimation problem
over social network. The underlying state of nature could be geographical coordinates of an event (target
localization problem) or reputation of a social unit (online reputation systems).
from the network shown in Fig.5a, there is no need for the communication graph to be a tree.
D. Discussion of Data Incest Removal in Social Learning
Here, we discuss the application of data incest removal Algorithm 1 (presented in Theorem 3.2) in two
examples of multi-agent state estimation problem which are presented in Sec.I-B: (i) online reputation
systems, and (ii) target localization using social networks, see Fig.1. As explained in Sec.I, data incest
makes the estimates of the underlying state of nature biased in these two examples. Both problems can
be formulated using the five-step constrained social learning protocol presented in Sec.I-A. As illustrated
in Fig.6, agents observe the underlying state of nature in noise and practice social learning to choose an
action such that a local cost function is minimized. But as a result of unknown communication graph
and the recursive nature of Bayesian estimators, data incest or abusive re-use of information occurs. To
mitigate data incest, the network administrator plays an intermediating role. Instead of transmitting the
communication graph and the set of all actions, the network administrator monitors all the information
exchanges and provides the data incest free public belief of social learning at each node. To compute the
data incest free public belief, the network administrator uses the optimal information aggregation scheme
(19) with the optimal weight vector wn, see (21)16. Using the most updated public belief and its own
16Also as discussed in Sec.I, an alternative method is to change action an to another action a∗n such that the new after-action
public belief is similar to that computed via (19).
private observation zn, node n evaluates its private belief. Based on this private belief (which is free of
data incest), action an is chosen and transmitted it over the network. Theorem 3.2 ensures that using the
optimal weight vector wn and given that the communication graph satisfies the topological Constraint 1,
the action an is not affected by data incest and performance of the state estimation is improved.
Remark 5: The results of this paper can be applied to a scenario where the network administrator
provides the after-action public beliefs to agents (instead of actions or the updated public belief). In this
scenario, agents combine the received after-action public beliefs using the optimal weight vector wn to
compute the updated public belief and then evaluate their private belief accordingly.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, numerical examples are given to illustrate the performance of data incest removal
Algorithm 1 presented in Sec.III. As described in the five-step protocol of Sec.I, agents interact on a
graph to estimate an underlying state of nature (which represents the location of a target event in target
localization problem, or the reputation of a social unit in online reputation systems). The underlying state
of nature x is a random variable uniformly chosen from X = {1, 2, · · · , 20}, and actions are chosen
from A = {1, 2, . . . 10}. We consider the following three scenarios for each of four different types of
social networks:
(i) Constrained social learning without data incest removal algorithm (data incest occurs) depicted with
dash-dot line
(ii) Constrained social learning with Protocol 1 with data incest removal algorithm depicted with dashed
line
(iii) Idealized framework where each node has the entire history of raw observations and thus data incest
cannot propagate. This scenario is only simulated for comparison purposes and is depicted by solid
line.
The effect of data incest on estimation problem and the performance of the data incest removal algorithm,
proposed in Sec.III, is investigated for the networks shown in Fig.7.
We first consider a communication graph with 41 nodes. The communication graph under study, which
is shown in Fig.7a, satisfies the topological constraint (20). The action of node 1 reaches all other nodes
and node 41 receives all actions of previous 40 nodes (some edges are omitted from the figure to make
it more clear).
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 7: Three different communication topologies: (a) the communication graph with 41 nodes, (b) agents
interact on a fully interconnected graph and the information from one agent reach other agents after a
delay chosen randomly from {1, 2} with the same probabilities, (c) star-shaped communication topology
with random delay chosen from {1, 2}.
As can be seen in Fig.8a, data incest makes agents’ actions in the constrained social learning without
data incest removal different from the same in the idealized framework. Also Fig.8a corroborates the
excellent performance of data incest removal Algorithm 1. As illustrated in Fig.8a, the actions of agents in
social learning with data incest removal algorithm are exactly similar to those of the idealized framework
without data incest. The social learning problem over the graph shown in Fig.7a is simulated 100 times to
investigate the difference between the estimated state of nature with the true one (x = 10). The estimates
of state of nature (obtained in three different scenarios discussed in the beginning of the section) are
depicted in Fig.8b. As can be seen from the figure, the estimates obtained with data incest removal
algorithm are very close to data incest free estimates of Scenario (iii). The bias in estimates in presence
of data incest is also clear in this figure.
In the next simulation, a different communication topology is considered. We repeat the simulation
for a star-shaped communication graph comprising of six agents (S = 6) at four time instants, K = 4,
so the total number of nodes in the communication graph is 24, see Fig.7c. The communication delay
is randomly chosen from {1, 2} with the same probabilities. We simulated the social learning in three
different scenarios discussed above, to investigate the effect of data incest on the actions and the estimates
of agents in the star-shaped social network. The actions chosen by nodes are depicted in Fig.9a. As can
be seen from Fig.9a, using the data incest removal algorithm
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Fig. 8: (a) Actions of agents obtained with social learning over social networks in three different scenarios
(constrained social learning without data incest removal, constrained social learning with data incest
removal algorithm, and idealized data incest free social learning) with communication graph depicted
in Fig.7a, (b) mean of the estimated state of nature in the state estimation problem with the same
communication graph.
learning with Protocol 1 are very close to those of the idealized social learning with Protocol 2 which are
free of data incest. Also the estimates of state of nature are very close to the true value of state of nature
compared to the constrained social learning without data incest removal algorithm. Also note that the
effect of data incest, as expected, in this communication topology is different for each agent; the agent
who communicates with all other nodes is affected more by data incest. This fact is verified in Fig.9.
In the third example, a complete fully interconnected graph (where agents communicate with all other
agents) is considered. In this example, action of each agent becomes available at all other agents after a
random delay chosen from {1, 2} with the same probabilities. The agents’ actions are shown in Fig.10a.
Similar to the star-shaped graph, using data incest removal Algorithm 1 makes the agents’ actions in
the constrained social learning very similar to those of the idealized (data incest free) framework. Also,
the excellent performance of data incest removal Algorithm 1 in the estimation problem is depicted in
Fig.10b.
We also extend our numerical studies to an arbitrary random network with five agents, S = 5,K = 4.
We consider a fully connected network and assume that the interaction between two arbitrary agents (say
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Fig. 9: (a) Actions of agents obtained with social learning over social networks in three different scenarios
(constrained social learning without data incest removal, constrained social learning with data incest
removal algorithm, and idealized data incest free social learning) with communication graph depicted
in Fig.7c,(b) mean of the estimated state of nature in the state estimation problem with the same
communication graph.
agent i and agent j) at time k has four (equiprobable) possible statuses: (i) connected with delay 1, (ii)
connected with delay 2, (iii) connected with delay 3, and (iv) not connected. If the link is connected
with delay τ , this means that the information from agent (i) at time k becomes available at agent j
at time k + τ . If the link is not connected, the information of agent i at time k never reaches agent
j. We verify that the underlying communication graph, Gn, satisfies the topological Constraint 1 with
simulation. Fig.11a depicts the agents’ actions in three different scenarios (with data incest, without data
incest, and with data incest removal algorithm). The simulation results show that, even in this case with
arbitrary network (that satisfies topological constraint), the actions obtained by the constrained social
learning with data incest removal algorithm is very close to those in the idealized social learning. As
expected, using the data incest removal algorithm, the data incest associated with the estimates of agents
can be mitigated completely, as shown in Fig.11b.
Here, we discuss the accuracy of the state estimates in terms of mean squared error with numerical
studies. The mean squared error of estimates obtained in social learning with three different scenarios
discussed in the beginning of this section (with data incest, with data incest removal algorithm, and the
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Fig. 10: (a) Actions of agents obtained with social learning over social networks in three different scenarios
(constrained social learning without data incest removal, constrained social learning with data incest
removal algorithm, and idealized data incest free social learning) with communication graph depicted
in Fig.7b, (b) mean of the estimated state of nature in the state estimation problem with the same
communication graph.
idealized framework) is computed for each of four communication graphs considered in our numerical
studies. The results are depicted in Fig.12. As can be seen from Fig.12, the estimates of the constrained
social learning with data incest removal Algorithm 1 are more accurate than the those of the constrained
social learning in presence of data incest. However, as a result of herding, in star shaped and random
communication topologies, the mean squared error of estimates is slightly (compared to the scenario
without data incest removal algorithm) more than the idealized framework at each time.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the state estimation problem in social networks with social learning is investigated. The
state of nature could be geographical coordinates of an event (target localization problem) or quality of a
social unit (online reputation system). As discussed in the paper, data incest arises in this setup as a result
of the recursive nature of Bayesian estimation and random communication delays in social networks. We
proposed a data incest removal algorithm for the multi-agent social learning in social networks in this
paper along with a topological necessary and sufficient condition for data incest free estimation. The
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Fig. 11: (a) Actions of agents obtained with social learning over social networks in three different scenarios
(constrained social learning without data incest removal, constrained social learning with data incest
removal algorithm, and idealized data incest free social learning) with arbitraty communication graph,
(b) mean of the estimated state of nature in the state estimation problem with the same communication
graph.
main difference of this work with the existing data incest removal algorithms in the literature is that in
this paper we consider the data incest removal algorithm in social learning context where only public
belief of agents (which can be computed directly from actions) is transmitted over the network while
in existing data incest removal algorithms (in sensor networks or social networks) the private belief of
agents which depends on their private observations are transmitted through the network. In the future
work, we will consider the application of the results of this paper in the problem of inference in the
graphical models using message passing algorithms.
APPENDIX
A. Some Graph Theoretic Definitions
Graph, Directed Graph, Path and Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG):
• A graph GN comprising of N nodes is a pair (V,E), where V = {v1, . . . , vN} is a set of nodes
(also called vertices), and E ⊂ V × V is a set of edges between the nodes.
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Fig. 12: Mean squared error of estimates (of state of nature) obtained with social learning with (a)
communication graph depicted in Fig.7a, (b) complete fully interconnected graph depicted in Fig.7b, (c)
arbitrary communication graph, and (d) star-shaped communication graph depicted in Fig.7c.
• Graph GN is an undirected graph if for any (vi, vj) ∈ E then (vj , vi) ∈ E and a graph is said to
be directed if (vj , vi) ∈ E is not a consequence of (vi, vj) ∈ E.
• A path is an alternating sequence of nodes and edges, beginning and ending with an edge, in which
each node is incident to the two edges that precede and follow it in the sequence.
• A Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) is a directed graph with no path that starts and ends at the same
node.
• A family of DAGs GN is defined as a set of DAGs {G1, . . . , GN} where Gn is the sub-graph of
Gn+1 such that for n = 1, . . . , N − 1

Vn = Vn+1/vn+1 ,
En = En+1/{(vi, vn+1) ∈ En+1|vi ∈ Vn+1} .
(22)
Adjacency and Transitive Closure matrices:
Let GN = (V,E) denote a graph with N nodes V = {v1, . . . , vN}.
• The Adjacency Matrix A of GN is an N ×N matrix whose elements A(i, j) are given by
A(i, j) =


1 if (vj , vi) ∈ E ,
0 otherwise
. A(i, i) = 0. (23)
• The Transitive Closure Matrix T of GN is an N ×N matrix whose elements T (i, j) are given by
T (i, i) = 1, and
T (i, j) =


1 if there is a path between vj and vi ,
0 otherwise
. (24)
The following shows the special form of the adjacency matrix of the directed acyclic graph and provides
a closed form expression to compute the transitive closure matrix from the adjacency matrix of a directed
acyclic graph.
Lemma 1.1: A sufficient condition for a graph GN to be a DAG is that the Adjacency matrix A is an
upper triangular matrix. For a DAG GN , the Transitive Closure Matrix T is related to the Adjacency
matrix by
T = Q({IN −A}
−1). (25)
Here, IN is the N ×N identity matrix, and Q denote the matrix valued ”quantization” function so that
for any N ×N -matrix B, Q(B) is the N ×N matrix with elements
Q(B)(i, j) =


0 if B(i, j) = 0 ,
1 if B(i, j) 6= 0
. (26)
Proof: This result is derived from the classical interpretation of matrix {IN −A}−1. The entry in row
i and column j of this matrix gives the number of paths from node i to node j. 
To deal with information flow in a social network, we now introduce the concept of a family of DAGs.
Remark 6: For the sake of simplicity in notations, let us define two vector representatives of adjacency
and transitive closure matrices of directed acyclic graph. For each graph Gn ∈ GN , let the n×n matrices
An and Tn, respectively, denote the adjacency matrix and transitive closure matrix. Define the following:

tn ∈ {0, 1}
1×(n−1): transpose of first n− 1 elements of nth column of Tn,
bn ∈ {0, 1}
1×(n−1): transpose of first n− 1 elements of nth column of An.
(27)
Remark 7: As can be straightforwardly followed from the construction of adjacency and transitive
closure matrices in (22), for a family of DAGs GN = {G1, . . . , GN}, for any n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, the
adjacency matrix An and transitive closure matrix Tn of graph Gn are respectively the n× n left upper
matrices of the adjacency matrix An+1 and transitive closure matrix Tn+1 of graph Gn+1.
B. Proof of Theorem 2.1
To prove that the graph Gn = (Vn, En) from family Gn is a directed acyclic graph, we only need to
show that the adjacency matrix of Gn is an upper triangular matrix. Then from Lemma 1.1, the graph
Gn is a directed acyclic graph. Suppose that vi and vj are two vertices of Gn, that is vi, vj ∈ Vn. From
re-indexing scheme (6), vi and vj represents agents si and sj at time instants ki and kj , respectively.
We have vi = si + S(ki − 1) and vj = sj + S(kj − 1). Because of the information flow, information of
each agent may become available at other agents at later time instants, a message cannot travel back in
the time! This means that if ki < kj , there should not be an edge from vj to vi, (vj , vi) /∈ En. Using
re-indexing scheme if ki < kj , then vi < vj (because ki and kj are integers and si, sj ≤ S). Therefore,
we deduce that
i < j ⇒ (vj , vi) /∈ En. (28)
Consequently, the Adjacency Matrix is a strictly upper triangular matrix so that Gn is a DAG. Then it
follows from the construction of the DAGs that GN is a family of DAGs.
C. Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof: We assume that each node has the most up-to-date public belief of social learning, pi−n =
p(x|Θn). This node records its own private observation zn = zl. The private belief is
µn(m) = p(x = xm|Θn, zn). (29)
Using Bayes’ theorem, (30) can be written as
µn(m) = p(x = xm|Θn, zn) = cp(zn|x)p(x|Θn)
= cpi−n(m)Bml. (30)
The normalizing factor c is used to make µn a true probability mass function, that is
∑X
m=1 µn(m) = 1.
Expected cost given µn is equal to C ′aµn thus the action an is an = argmina∈A{C ′aµn}. To complete the
proof, we need to compute the after-action public belief, pi+n = p(x|Θn, an). Applying Bayes’ theorem,
the after action public belief can be written as
pi+n(m) = p(x = xm|Θn, an) = cp(an|Θn, x)p(x = xm|Θn)
= cp(an|x, pi−n)pi−n(m) = c
Z∑
j=1
p(an|x, z = zj , pi−n)p(z = zj). (31)
Knowing observations and public belief, the private belief can be computed. From the private belief, the
action an is speified. Thus
p(an|x, z = zj, pi−n) =


1 if an = argmina∈A{C ′aBjpi−n}
0 if an 6= argmina∈A{C ′aBjpi−n}
(32)
where Bj = diag(B1j, . . . , BXj). Using indicator function I(·), Eq. (32) can be reorganized as
p(an|x, z = zj , pi−n) =
∏
â∈A−{an}
I(C ′anBjpi−n < C
′
âBjpi−n) (33)
Substituting (33) in (31) completes the proof as follows
pi+n(m) = cpi−n(m)
Z∑
j=1

 ∏
â∈A−{an}
I(C ′anBjpi−n < C
′
âBjpi−n)

Bmj (34)
D. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof: The logarithm of the after-action public belief of learning problem (14) with benchmark
information exchange Protocol 2, θfulln , is log
(
p(x|Θfulln , Gn)
)
. Recall that Θfulln denotes the entire history
of actions from previous nodes who have a path to node n and Si denotes the set of all actions that ai
depends on them. Also from definition of the transitive closure matrix (24) and tn in (27), the nodes who
have a path to node n are corrosponding to non-zero elements of tn. Because if tn(i) = 1, then there
exists a path from node i to node n. Therefore, the after-action public belief can be written as
p(x|Θfulln , an, Gn) =cp(an|Sn, x)p(x|{ai; ai ∈ Θ
full
n })
=cpi0p(an|Sn, x)
∏
ai∈Θfulln
p(ai|Si, x). (35)
Note that Bayes’ theorem is used recursively to expand p(x|{ai; ai ∈ Θfulln }) and Si includes actions(from
Θfulln ) into account that ai depends on them. Taking the logarithm of both sides of (35) yields
θfulln = log
(
p(x|Θfulln , an, Gn)
)
= log

cpi0p(an|Sn, x) ∏
ai∈Θfulln
p(ai|Si, x)


= log (p(an|Sn, x)) +
∑
tn(i)6=0
log (p(ai|Si, x)) ,
=
n−1∑
i=1
tn(i)νi + νn, (36)
where νi denotes log (p(ai|x, Si)). Note that the normalizing constant c and pi0 are omitted for the sake
of simplicity as they are the same for both learning problems (11) with the constrained social learning
Protocol 1 and (14) with the benchmark Protocol 2.
E. Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof: The aim here is to show that if wn = tn
(
T ′n−1
)−1 then θ̂n defined in (19) is exactly equal
to θfulln in (15). Before proceeding, let us first rewrite (19) and (15) using the following notations
θfulln = νn + (tn ⊗ Id)ν1:n−1,
θ̂n = νn + (wn ⊗ Id)θ̂1:n−1, (37)
where θ̂1:n−1 , [θ̂′1, . . . , θ̂′n−1]′, ν1:n−1 , [ν ′1, . . . , ν ′n−1]′ ∈ R(n−1)d×1. Here ⊗ denotes Kronecker
(tensor) product and Id denotes the d× d identity matrix.
To prove Theorem 3.2, we first start from
θ̂n = θ
full
n . (38)
Assume that (38) holds for all i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. From (19), θfulln can be written as (given that Eq. (38)
holds)
θfulln = θ̂n = (wn ⊗ Id)θ̂1:n−1 + νn
= (wn ⊗ Id)θ
full
1:n−1 + νn. (39)
Eq. (38) holds for all i where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, θ̂1:n−1 = θfull1:n−1. From (15) in Theorem 3.1, θfull1:n−1
can be expressed as
θfull1:n−1 =
(
T ′n−1
)
ν1:n−1. (40)
Note that in the derivation of (40), we use the definition of tn−1 in (27) as the first n − 2 elements of
Tn−1 and so on. Using (40), (39) can be written as
θfulln = (wn ⊗ Id)
(
T ′n−1
)
ν1:n−1 + νn. (41)
From (15) in Theorem 3.1, we have another expression for θfulln . Comparing (41) and (15) yields
(tn ⊗ Id)ν1:n−1 = (wn ⊗ Id)
(
T ′n−1
)
ν1:n−1
=
(
(wnT
′
n−1)⊗ Id
)
ν1:n−1. (42)
Note that in going from the first line to the second line in (42), the distributive property of tensor
products is used. From (42) it can be inferred that tn = wnT ′n−1. As presented in Appendix A, Tn is
upper triangular matrix with ones in the diagonal. Therefore Tn is invertible and wn =
(
tnT
′
n−1
)−1
. To
complete the proof we need to start from wn =
(
tnT
′
n−1
)−1
and obtain θ̂n = θfulln . This part of proof
is straightforward and thus omitted from the paper. Note that the topological Constraint 1 says that if
bn(j) = 0 then the j−th entry of ν1:n−1 is not available to the node n and thus the corresponding element
of the weight vector wn(j) should be equal to zero as well. Also note that νn is computed by the network
administrant and the data incest free public belief, pi−n, is available to the network administrator.
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